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TERRORISM 
Professor Malvina Halberstam 
Terrorism - by which I mean indiscriminate attacks on civilians 
in the name of some political cause, such as the recent attacks at the 
Vienna and Rome airports, the seizure of the Achille Lauro, or the 
bombings in Melbourne we heard about on the news this morning - is 
perhaps the greatest challenge to international law today. Unfortu-
nately, there are very major gaps in the international law on terrorism. 
First, there is no generally accepted definition of terrorism under 
international law. Although the U.N. established an Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on International Terrorism in 1972, and the committee finally is-
sued a report in 1979, it did not succeed in either defining terrorism or 
producing a draft convention prohibiting terrorism. 
Second, there is no convention making it an offense under interna-
tional law to murder, assault, or injure anyone other than an interna-
tionally protected person. There are several . multilateral treaties which 
address specific aspects of terrorism. Treaties presently in effect apply 
to certain criminal and noncriminal acts aboard aircraft that interfere 
with its safety; to the seizure of aircraft; to acts which jeopardize the 
safety of aviation; to acts of violence against representatives of states 
and international organizations; to the taking of hostages; to the send-
ing of explosives by mail; to piracy; and to certain acts involving nu-
clear materials. Most of those conventions were adopted within the last 
ten or fifteen years. A number of these conventions require designated 
states to take the necessary measures under their internal law to estab-
lish jurisdiction over those who engage in the proscribed conduct and 
provide that the state in whose territory the terrorist is found must ei-
ther extradite him or try him. There is no treaty, however, making the 
threat or use of force against members of the general public an offense 
under international law. 
Third, even with respect to acts covered by the conventions, there 
is no assurance that states will either extradite or prosecute as required 
by the conventions, and no clear mandate for state action to prevent 
terrorist acts before they occur. 
a. The conventions do not provide that the political offense excep-
tion, included in many extradition treaties, does not apply to the of-
fenses defined by these conventions. Therefore, if the state in which the 
offender is found determines that it is a "political offense," it may take 
the position that it is not required to extradite. Since most present-day 
acts of terrorism are allegedly committed for political ends, the conven-
1986] CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 
tions may not impose meaningful extradition obligations, even with re-
spect to those acts covered. While the state in which the off ender is 
present is required to "submit" the case to its competent authorities for 
prosecution if it does not extradite, there is no assurance. that those 
authorities in turn will not decide that the case cannot be prosecuted 
under the state's law because of its political nature. 
b. The conventions do not provide any sanctions for a state's fail-
ure to extradite the offender or to submit the case to its authority for 
prosecution. None of the conventions specifically include conspiracy in 
the definition of the offense, and only the hostage-taking convention 
requires states to prohibit groups and organizations that encourage, in-
stigate, organize, or engage in the prohibited conduct. 
c. None of the conventions specifically include conspiracy in the 
definition of the offense and only the Hostage Taking Convention re-
quires states to prohibit "groups and organizations that encourage, in-
stigate, organize or engage" in the prohibited conduct. Terrorist activi-
ties, though carried out by individuals, are generally planned by 
organizations. While the accomplice provision may apply to co-conspir-
ators under the internal law of some jurisdictions, and the Montreal, 
Internationally Protected Persons and Hostage Taking Conventions re-
quire states to take measures to prevent the proscribed conduct, which 
could, arguably be a basis for criminalizing conspiracy and outlawing 
organizations that plan, fund, or otherwise aid or abet terrorism, the 
failure to specifically include conspiracy in the definition of the offense 
and to require states to outlaw organizations that plan, fund or other-
wise aid and abet in the commission of the prohibited conduct is a seri-
ous weakness. 
d. The conventions do not provide for jurisdiction by the state of 
the victim, except for the Hostage Convention, which makes it discre-
tionary, and the Internationally Protected Persons Convention, which 
provides for jurisdiction by the state on whose behalf the victim per-
formed the functions that establish the status of an internationally pro-
tected person. More and more, citizens of particular states are singled 
out for terrorist attack, either to compel that state to do something or 
to express disapproval of something that state is doing or has done. 
Fourth, it is not clear whether terrorist acts on the high seas, such 
as the seizure of the Achille Lauro, constitute piracy. Piracy has long 
been considered hostis humanis generis, a threat to all nations. It is 
one of the oldest, and perhaps only, crimes for which universal jurisdic-
tion is generally accepted under international law. 
While there was no generally accepted definition of piracy prior to 
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the adoption of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, there is sub-
stantial support in the writings of publicists and in the practice of 
states for the position that terrorist acts on the high seas, such as the 
seizure of the Achille Lauro, would constitute piracy under customary 
international law. 
Courts in the United States and Britain and a number of promi-
nent publicists took the position that unauthorized acts of violence com-
mitted on the high seas constitute piracy. For example, Oppenheim's 
International Law, edited by Lauterpacht, states: 
If a definition is desired which really covers all acts that are in practice 
treated as piratical, piracy must be defined as every unauthorized act of vio-
lence against persons or goods committed on the open sea, either by a private 
vessel against another vessel or by the mutinous crew or passengers against 
their own vessel. 
In a landmark English decision, In re Piracy Jus Gentium, the 
court said, "Possibly the definition of piracy which comes nearest to 
accuracy coupled with brevity is that given by Kenney, where he says, 
'Piracy is any armed violence at sea which is not a lawful act of war.' " 
One of the more controversial areas under customary law con-
cerned the treatment to be accorded to insurgents who had not 
achieved the status of recognized belligerents. In The Ambrose Light, a 
U.S. court refused to exempt insurgents from the laws of piracy. Hall, 
on the other hand, argued that it was improper to treat insurgents 
fighting for political independence as pirates. Attacking the state ships 
at sea was one of the ways in which such independence could be estab-
lished. The essence of piracy was that it was for private, as contrasted 
with public, ends; and insurgents seeking to overthrow their govern-
ment were not a threat to all nations, their attacks being limited to 
ships of the state from which they were seeking independence. He said, 
contrasting the insurgent with the pirate, "The man who acts with a 
public object may do like acts (as the pirate) to a certain extent, but 
his moral attitude is different, and the acts themselves will be kept 
within well marked bounds. He is not only not the enemy of the human 
race, but he is the enemy solely of a particular State." 
Most of those who took the position that insurgents fighting for 
independence should be exempt from the laws of piracy stressed that 
the exemption applied only if the acts were directed solely against a 
particular state, and nationals and vessels of all other states were un-
harmed. Hyde, for example, states that the United States has at vari-
ous times expressed reluctance to treat as piratical the operations of 
insurgent vessels engaged in furthering a public end, and when directed 
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solely against persons and property associated with the government 
sought to be overthrown. He cites a memorandum from the Solicitor of 
the United States, Department of State, in which he says that "the 
question whether a vessel in the hands of insurgents is piratical depends 
upon its actions; that is, whether it confines itself to depredations 
against its own country or commits depredations against vessels of 
other countries." Similarly, Whorton wrote, "Armed cruisers which, 
though claiming to be commissioned by insurgents, prey on merchant 
vessels of all nationalities, indiscriminately, are to be regarded as 
pirates." 
Thus, while there was no authoritative definition of piracy, it may 
fairly be concluded that under the prevailing view of piracy in custom-
ary international law, terrorist acts such as the seizure of the Achille 
Lauro and the murder of its passengers would not have been exempt. 
Even those publicists who urged, and those states that accepted, an ex-
emption for insurgents extended it only to insurgents whose acts are 
directed against a particular state. The exclusion would therefore not 
apply to present-day terrorists such as the hijackers of the Achille 
Lauro, who held its passengers hostage and killed one of them, since 
their acts are clearly not limited to the ships or nationals of a particu-
lar state. 
However, under the Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the 
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, piracy is defined as an act 
"committed for private ends ... by the crew or passengers of a private 
ship against ... another ship." It is argued that terrorist acts, such as 
the seizure of the Achille Lauro, do not constitute piracy under these 
conventions, since such acts, having a political motive, are not for "pri-
vate ends." It is arguable, based under Travaux Preparatoire, that the 
for-private-ends proviso was not intended to exclude terrorist acts from 
piracy. 
The International Law Commission Draft of what ultimately be-
came the Geneva Convention relied heavily on the Harvard Draft on 
piracy and the supporting research thereto. While there is language in 
the Comment to the Harvard Draft and the summary records of the 
International Law Commission contrasting "private ends" with "politi-
cal ends," a careful analysis of the Comment to the Harvard Draft and 
of the statements of the Reporter for the International Law Commis-
sion suggest a narrower definition of "private ends." 
A review of the Comment to the Harvard Draft and of the author-
ities quoted therein indicates that the Harvard Draft was primarily 
concerned to exclude from the definition of piracy acts by insurgents 
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who had not achieved belligerent status - the position advocated by 
Hall and other publicists - but on which authorities were divided, as 
the Comment to the Harvard Draft acknowledged, and that the term 
"for private ends" was used for that purpose. However, as indicated 
earlier, even those who advocated that position limited it to insurgents 
who did not harm nationals or ships of the United States. 
The discussion before the International Law Commission indicates 
that the members of the Commission were primarily concerned with 
whether acts by state vessels could be considered piratical, in view of 
events then occurring in the China Sea. A majority of the Commission 
voted to retain the for-private-ends proviso, interestingly enough, in or-
der to reject the position of Communist Bloc states that acts by state 
vessels could be considered piratical. It was never suggested in the 
Comment to the Harvard Draft, in the discussion of the piracy articles 
by the Commission, or in the Report of the Commission to the General 
Assembly, that acts by terrorists who attack ships of nationals of all 
states indiscriminately are not piratical. 
Another problem under the Geneva Convention definition articles 
on piracy, insofar as the seizure of the Achille Lauro is concerned, is 
the requirement that the act be by one ship "against another." While 
there is very little discussion of the requirement that the act be directed 
"against another ship," its purpose clearly was to exclude from univer-
sal jurisdiction situations such as the murder of a passenger or crew 
member aboard a ship by another passenger or crew member, or a mu-
tiny in which the crew removed the captain but continued to accept the 
authority of the flag State. 
A careful reading of the Travaux Preparatoire would support a 
definition which might not limit it to acts by one ship against the other, 
but again, what we would have to do is rely on the work product or the 
history rather than the exact language of the Convention. That in itself 
poses a problem. 
Surely whether acts by terrorists seizing ships, holding people hos-
tage, killing passengers should or should not be the subject of a state's 
right to arrest and punish the perpetrators should not depend on 
whether they happen to seize the ship disguised as crew members or 
passengers or by using another ship. 
So, while the apparent limitation of the Geneva Convention lan-
guage may not be as limiting as it appears on its face, when the legisla-
tive history is considered, I think a new convention, which would specif-
ically prohibit terrorist acts on the high seas and grant jurisdiction to 
specific states along the lines of the Hostage Convention, or provide for 
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universal jurisdiction, as in piracy, would be preferable. 
Fifth, there is also disagreement among scholars whether a state 
may use force to rescue persons being held or threatened by terrorists 
when the state in whose territory they are either unable or unwilling to 
protect the victims. 
Customary international law has long recognized a right of self-
help and of humanitarian intervention when there is an imminent 
threat to life and the state in whose territory it occurs is either unable 
or unwilling to prevent it. Some scholars have argued - erroneously, I 
believe - that self-help and humanitarian intervention are prohibited 
by the U.N. Charter. 
Article 2( 4) of the Charter provides that all members shall refrain 
"from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the 
political independence of any State." When force is used to rescue per-
sons whose lives are in imminent danger and the force is withdrawn as 
soon thereafter as possible, as required under customary international 
law rules, it is not used "against the territorial integrity or political 
independence" of a state. Moreover, article 51 of the Charter specifi-
cally provides, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inher-
ent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack oc-
curs." It is arguable that a state's use of force to rescue its nationals 
from terrorist attack is a proper exercise of the right to self-defense. 
The argument is particularly strong when the attack is against the 
state's representatives, whether diplomatic as in the Iranian hostage 
crisis, or military as in the attack on U.S. Marines in Lebanon, since 
the attack is clearly against the state. But the argument is also tenable 
when the victims do not formally represent the state, if they are seized 
and threatened by reason of their nationality. 
Finally, the Charter proscription on the use of force by individual 
states was coupled with a provision for the collective use of force by the 
Security Council and based on the expectation that the latter would 
make the former unnecessary, an expectation that has, unfortunately, 
not been realized. An interpretation of the U.N. Charter that would 
bar humanitarian intervention, notwithstanding that the Security 
Council is paralyzed by the veto, would have the paradoxical result of 
denying those whose lives and freedom are in imminent danger the pro-
tection that they had prior to the adoption of the Charter, even though 
one of the primary purposes of the Charter was to promote the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of all. 
To the extent that state practice is a guide, states have apparently 
not interpreted the Charter as barring self-help and humanitarian in-
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tervention. In three major instances in which persons were held hos-
tage, and the state in which they were so held could not or would not 
take action, the state whose nationals were threatened used, or was 
ready to use, force to free them; Egypt in Malta, most recently; the 
United States in Iran; and Israel in Entebbe. 
Terrorism as we know it today - the indiscriminate attack on 
civilians in the air, on land, or at sea, in many parts of the world, as an 
almost weekly if not daily occurrence - is a relatively recent develop-
ment. The only phenomenon that I can think of that was a similar 
threat to civilians of all nations was piracy. 
There, international law responded to the challenge by declaring 
pirates hostis humanis generis, the enemies of all mankind, and pro-
vided universal jurisdiction over pirates. That meant that all states had 
the right, and possibly the obligation, to seize, try and punish those 
who engaged in piracy regardless of the nationality of the offender or 
of the victim. 
By contrast, the indiscriminate killing of civilians in the name of 
some political cause has not been made a crime under international 
law; quite the contrary. Even an act that would be piracy may arguably 
not be piracy under the Geneva Convention and under the U .N. Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea if it is committed for alleged political 
motives, or if the act is committed by seizing control of a ship rather 
than by using two ships. 
The argument is made that the international community cannot 
prohibit terrorism without first resolving the causes of terrorism. It is a 
dangerous and fallacious argument. The international community has 
not resolved the causes of war, but certain types of warfare have long 
been prohibited by international law, including the deliberate killing of 
civilians. The prohibition against indiscriminate, violent attacks on 
members of the general public cannot await the resolution of the causes 
of terrorism. 
Every General Assembly resolution condemning terrorism includes 
a paragraph reaffirming the right to self-determination and indepen-
dence of all people, the legitimacy of their struggles, and, in particular, 
the struggle of national liberation movements. Is the implication that, if 
people are fighting for self-determination, terrorism is permitted? If 
not, why is the condemnation of terrorism always coupled with a refer-
ence to the right of self-determination? 
Certain conduct should be prohibited by international law regard-
less of the aim of those who engage in it. That principle was firmly 
established by the adoption of the Hostage Convention. The negotiating 
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history of the Hostage Convention also demonstrated that if the states 
that believe that certain conduct should be prohibited regardless of mo-
tive are persistent, other states may ultimately be persuaded to agree. 
When the convention against the taking of hostages was first dis-
cussed, a number of Arab and African States argued that it should not 
apply to any act by "national liberation movements against colonial 
rule, racist and foreign regimes." The representative of one state went 
so far as to say, "There are two alternatives: Either there would be an 
internationally accepted convention against the taking of hostages 
which does not apply to acts carried out by recognized national libera-
tion movements in the course of their struggles, or there would be no 
convention at all." The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and other Western States insisted that the prohibition against the tak-
ing of hostages had to be absolute and without exception, pointing out 
that hostage taking was prohibited even in time of war by the Geneva 
Convention. In the end, the Arab and African States were apparently 
persuaded. After two years of meetings by the ad hoc committee, the 
representative of Algeria explained, 
in order to avoid any misunderstanding, he wished to make it clear that his 
delegation had no intention of giving a blank check for hostage taking to any 
group or entity whatever. As parties to international armed conflicts, national 
liberation movements were subject to the law of war, which in essence prohib-
ited acts of hostage taking. 
And the representative of the Soviet Union noted, "The debate in 
the ad hoc committee shows that no delegation intended to reserve to 
the national liberation movement the right to take hostages. The taking 
of hostages was generally recognized as a criminal act without 
exception." 
The convention as finally adopted prohibited hostage taking abso-
lutely and without exception and required any state in which the of-
fender is present to either extradite or prosecute him, either under the 
Geneva Conventions and protocols, if they apply, or under the Hostage 
Convention if they don't apply. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians must 
similarly be prohibited by international law, absolutely and without 
exception. 
The challenge to international law - the greatest challenge per-
haps facing international law today - is to adopt a convention defining 
terrorism, prohibiting it absolutely and regardless of motive, and vest-
ing jurisdiction to seize, try and punish terrorists either in specified 
states, as the Hostage Convention does, with the concomitant require-
ment that any state in which the offender is found must either extradite 
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or prosecute him, or establishing universal jurisdiction over terrorists in 
all states, comparable to the universal jurisdiction over pirates, since 
terrorists today, lik~ pirates of old, are hostis humanis generis, a threat 
to all nations. 
